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ABSTRACT 
Every action is perceived by an audience that is subsequently influenced through 
the exposure to the action. This audience can be composed of declared and armed 
combatants, members of an extremist group, allies, or civilians. The possible end 
states for the influenced target audience are (a) behavior change, (b) belief change, (c) 
maintain current behavior, or (d) maintain current belief. It is a missed opportunity by 
the Marine Corps to not best posture itself to shape those outcomes, or at the very 
least, attempt to guide them. In the effort to shape the four possible end states, planners 
must identify the most effective way to affect the anticipated audience. Numerous 
research efforts have shown that the most effective way to influence an 
audience’s behavior and/or belief is through affecting emotion. Subsequently, 
numerous studies have shown that the most effective way to affect emotion is 
through a well-communicated narrative or story. Every activity conducted by the 
Marine Corps, whether it is a declared combat operation or a routine training 
evolution, must be considered as “observable” in the information 
environment, thereby giving it an intended and unintended audience. This thesis 
draws heavily from literature on narratives and story architecture to provide an 
addendum to current Marine Corps planning procedures, ultimately leading to an 
enhanced planning process that effectively incorporates audience emotional 
considerations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Marine Corps planners are effective and efficient at planning for mission success 
in the physical realm; deconflicting and maximizing impacts in the Ground, Sea, and Air 
domains. However, a gap arises in Marine Corps planning when factoring in human 
audiences and the unavoidable perceptions they generate as a result of observing Marine 
Corps activities. Across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO), every military 
activity will generate impacts in the Information Environment (IE). These impacts are 
associated with the inherent information generated as a result of physical actions.1 
Observations of these military activities by a human audience lead to perception, 
emotion, belief, and ultimately behavior responses which can manifest in physical 
domain actions.  
Emotional considerations of an audience cannot be dismissed because emotions 
are inherent to all humans. It is this universal commonality which the Marine Corps can 
capitalize on in its efforts to improve effectiveness within the IE. As explained in the 
academic literature review in Chapter II, human emotional responses have been proven 
to correlate to behavior responses.2 Additionally, the concept of story architecture is an 
established technique utilized to gain and maintain an audience’s attention through 
emotional engagement.3 By incorporating story architecture into their planning 
processes, Marine units can effectively leverage a proven emotional influence tactic to 
proactively plan for and guide audience observations and attempt to shape the 
perceptions, emotions, beliefs, and ultimately behaviors that are generated. By increasing 
focus of human emotional considerations early on in the Marine Corps Planning Process, 
1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, JP 3-0. (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), III-22, 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp30ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910. 
2 “Empathy, Neurochemistry, and the Dramatic Arc: Paul Zak at the Future of StoryTelling 2012,” 
October 3, 2012, YouTube, video, 5:58, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1a7tiA1Qzo&t=99s. 
3 Kendall Haven, Story Smart: Using the Science of Story to Persuade, Influence, Inspire, and Teach 
(California: Libraries Unlimited, 2014), 22. 
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units can be afforded the opportunity to anticipate and proactively attempt to shape the 
observations an audience may have as a result of their military activity.  
This is not a report focused on Psychological Operations (PSYOP), nor is it a 
study of the specific Information Related Capability (IRC) of Military Information 
Support Operations (MISO). Instead, this report is focused on the Marine Corps’ need to 
better plan for and control impacts in the IE; impacts that are generated in a human’s 
cognition as a result of their emotional responses to their observations. The solution to 
aid planners in better accounting for IE impacts is a simple, standardized, and methodical 
planning process which accounts for a basic, yet dominant human element intrinsic to all 
audiences: emotion.  
A. BACKGROUND: MILITARY 
Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) comprises concepts which may 
prove to be difficult in their application to military activities. This is due in part to the 
complexity of the Information Environment (see Figure 1) and the lack of tangibility 
associated with the human cognitive dimension and its many variables. The Information 
Environment is shown to span all other domains of the Operational Environment; 
demonstrating the need for Information, as a warfighting function, to be integrated with 
all other warfighting elements. 
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Figure 1. Information Environment as Part of the Operational Environment4 
The intangible nature of the Information Environment requires a qualitative vice 
quantitative approach to its study. This thesis is structured as a top-down approach to 
understanding the IE; from the literature governing military thought at the national level 
contained in the National Security Strategy (NSS) to the operational level in the U.S. 
Marine Corps’ Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG). These documents promote a 
common theme: information operations and American influence must advance to better 
compete in the current, more sophisticated battlespace where the speed and volume of 
information has reached a highly complex level. 
The current National Security Strategy, at the time of this thesis, was signed in 2017 
by President Trump. The strategy specifically dictates the need for the United States to 
advance American influence. Within the NSS, a strategic gap is identified. The efforts of 
the U.S. to counter adversary information exploitation have been tepid and fragmented.5 
 
4 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Planning, JP 5-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), 
IV-8, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp50.pdf?ver=usfQpGSu65ateysm 
Ang%3D%3D. 
5 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
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As a result, a priority for information efforts emerged: the U.S. must craft and disseminate 
coherent campaigns to promote pro-American influence and combat adversary messages.6 
Nested under the NSS is the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Within the brief, 
unclassified version of the NDS, influence is mentioned eight times. Emphasis is given to 
adversary nations and their current efforts to promote regional influence. In response, the 
NDS advocates for the sustainment of American influence across the globe; highlighting 
the failure to do so will incur deteriorating cohesion with U.S. allies and partners.7 These 
themes highlight U.S. adversaries and competitors are actively participating in affecting 
the Information Environment. 
General Berger states in his 38th CPG (signed in 2019), “We must communicate 
with precision and consistency, based on a common focus and a unified message.”8 This 
statement resonates most-strongly with unit commanders and the Information professionals 
across the Marine Corps. This is accomplished through bottom-up planning where Marine 
Corps operations planners broaden the aperture of their planning tasks from the basic 
“beans, bullets, and bandages” logistics and supply requirements. Instead, planners must 
account for human-based factors which are not readily quantifiable. The difficulty arises 
when planners do not have the tools nor resident knowledge available to them to define 
their operation’s specific information battlefield, and more importantly, define the potential 
audiences within that battlefield. The proposed ECPP will provide Marine Corps planners 
with a logical and methodical addendum to their current planning processes, enabling them 
to account for emotional considerations and the cognitive element of the Information 
Environment. This planning tool allows for Information to be incorporated early in the 
planning process, synthesizing more effectively with the other warfighting functions. This 
will aid in mitigating a bad practice which has materialized in recent years where 
 
6 White House. 
7 Department of Defense. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/ 
pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
8 Berger, David. 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance. Arlington, VA: United States Marine Corps, 
2019. 
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Information is “sprinkled in” to the planning process, vice playing a larger role in the 
planned activity.   
In 2019, the 37th Commandant of the Marine Corps passed into doctrine the 
establishment of Information as the seventh Marine Corps warfighting function.9 This act 
was predicated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs establishing Information as the seventh 
Joint function in July 2017.10 Marine Corps Bulletin (MCBUL) 5400 states, “The 
Information warfighting function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage 
the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its application across all 
operational phases and the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). This function provides 
the Marine Corps with the ability to integrate the generation and reservation of friendly 
information while leveraging the inherent informational aspects of all military activities 
and Service level operations to achieve Marine Corps objectives.”11  
Within this statement resides a key component for understanding the Information 
Environment and its ubiquitous nature. Information is pervasive and is imbedded in every 
activity across the ROMO (see Figure 2). This implies all military activities conducted by 
the Marine Corps contain aspects which directly impact the IE. This statement serves as 
the crux to understanding OIE and the scope of this thesis. Every action, whether it is a 
routine training exercise, or declared combat operation will generate results in the IE. These 
results manifest in the form of perceptions, emotions, beliefs, and behaviors.  
 
9 Neller, Robert. Marine Corps Bulletin 5400. Washington, DC. United States Marine Corps, 2019. 
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCBUL%205400.pdf?ver=2019-02-06-082807-103 
10 Mattis, James. “Information as a Joint Function.” Official Memorandum. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2017. https://www.rmda.army.mil/records-management/docs/SECDEF-
Endorsement_Information_Joint%20 Function_Clean.pdf. 
11 Neller, Marine Corps Bulletin 5400. 
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Figure 2. Range of Military Operations12 
Kinetic fires produce a more-tangible cause-and-effect result in the physical 
domain. These effects are easier to plan. One can logically predict the result of a Marine 
platoon formation moving to contact with an enemy, or the result of a 60-millimeter 
mortar’s payload landing on a target. These effects are well-known, by Marine Corps 
standards, and can quickly have their effects measured. Further, these effects are governed 
by well-understood laws of physics. The tangibility aspect of kinetic fires and physical 
domain effects fit into the current MCPP and its warfighting nature. 
While more difficult to anticipate, effects in the cognitive dimension must also be 
equally planned during the MCPP. This will lead to effective perception management and 
a unified Marine Corps message. Additionally, organizing a narrative and planning it 
concurrently with the operational planning process will afford Marine Corps equities to 
promote a desired, and anticipated perception of its activities. Without planning for an 
audience’s emotions, the Marine Corps has no control over the effects its audience’s 
observations will generate. 
 
12 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, V-4. 
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B. BACKGROUND: THE SCIENCE BEHIND INFLUENCE 
The Information Environment is highly complex. For the scope of this report, the 
research is focused on the Informational and Cognitive Dimensions. Through these two 
dimensions, the most logical relationship occurs between military operations and 
emotional management considerations which facilitate perception, belief, and behavior 
management. Scientific studies and research have shown a direct, positive relationship 
between human brain activity associated with emotion, influence, and decision-making 
responses.13  
Communications theory behind the diffusion of ideas and messages explains how 
the thoughts and perceptions of an audience travel through a population. The main elements 
of diffusion of innovation are, (1) the Innovation itself, (2) Communication Channels, (3) 
Time, and (4) the Social System.14 These four elements align well to OIE concepts. For 
this thesis, the Innovation will be considered to be the message intended to be broadcast as 
a result of the ECPP. This message is intended to emotionally resonate with an audience, 
thereby maintaining their attention and ultimately facilitating behavior influence. Through 
having the desired perception received by the audience, the Communication Channels will 
be associated to the identified forms of communication used to broadcast the message. 
Examples of communications channels are social media posts, commercials, newspaper or 
magazine articles, website articles, interviews, public speeches, or simple word-of-mouth 
conversations which all stem from the basic observation of the activity. The Time element 
of diffusion transfers entirely to OIE, representing the time necessary for the message to 
diffuse and be communicated throughout the audience. The Social System element will be 
the analysis of the target audience, to include cultural idiosyncrasies such as religious, 
economic, or political factors. Diffusion is covered more extensively in Chapter II of this 
report.  
 
13 Jennifer Lerner, Ye Li, Piercarlo Valdesolo, and Karim Kassam, “Emotion and Decision Making,”    
     Annual Review of Psychology 66 (September 22, 2014): 799-823. 
14 Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations. 5th ed. (New York: Free Press, 2003). 
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This thesis draws heavily from literature on narratives and story architectures. Since 
humans have been able to converse, stories have been one of the most effective and 
commonly used communication methods to influence and engage others. An effective, well 
architected story is what emotionally engages the audience.15 The goal of the ECPP is to 
keep planners organized in factoring their military activity’s effect on audience 
observations. Audience observations can have subsequent IE responses and open potential 
avenues for influence.  
For the scope of this thesis, the definition used for influence is to change an 
audience’s beliefs, attitudes, values, knowledge, and/or behavior.16 The science of 
storytelling will form the framework of the ECPP to aid planners in engaging an audience 
with their desired narratives in order to maintain their attention. While maintaining the 
audience’s attention, a well-architected story will allow Marine Corps planners to 
effectively incorporate the required communications theory and influence techniques to 
affect the audience’s emotion and steer the possible influence outcomes. The relationship 
between emotion and story architecture is explained in Chapter II. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
Every action planned within the Marine Corps is perceived by an audience who is 
subsequently influenced through the exposure to the action. This audience can be 
comprised of declared and armed combatants, members of an extremist group, allies, or 
civilians. The possible end-states for the influenced target audience are changes to their 
beliefs, attitudes, values, knowledge, and/or behavior.17 Conversely, should the Marine 
Corps planner decide, the desired end-state could also be maintaining an audience’s current 
belief, attitude, value, knowledge, and/or behavior. It is a missed opportunity by the Marine 
Corps to not best posture itself to shape those outcomes; or at the very least, attempt to 
 
15 Kendall Haven, Story Smart: Using the Science of Story to Persuade, Influence, Inspire, and   
Teach. (Connecticut: Libraries Unlimited, 2014), 9. 
16 Haven, 9.  
17 Haven, 9.  
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acknowledge them. Numerous research efforts have shown the most effective way to 
influence an audience is through affecting emotion.18 Subsequently, numerous studies 
have shown the most effective way to affect emotion is through a well-communicated 
narrative or story.19 Every activity conducted by the Marine Corps, whether it is a declared 
combat operation, or a routine training evolution must be considered as “observable” in the 
IE thereby giving it an intended and unintended audience. Story structure is the 
fundamental way a human’s brain receives and makes sense of information.20 It is an 
evolutionary development over a hundred-thousand years. Fortunately, the researched and 
defined elements of story structure are relatively straight-forward, as depicted by Dr. 
Kendall Haven. This thesis will qualitatively explore literature and cases associated with 
the use of narratives, storytelling through human communication in order to inform Marine 
Corps planning of OIE; specifically in the area of effectively engaging targets through 
emotional appeals. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The primary research question for this thesis was, “Is the Marine Expeditionary 
Force (MEF) postured to appropriately manage a target audience’s emotions?” The 
secondary research question was, “What is the most effective way in which the MEF can 
manage human emotions?” Through answering these two questions, an overlap of doctrinal 
planning procedures and story architecture concepts was identified which provides a 
potential process which can be applied to existing Marine Corps planning procedures. 
E. METHODOLOGY  
The methodology utilized in this report is structured around three principal research 
areas. (1) A review of current military doctrine and publications which guide the Marine 
Corps operations community to plan and conduct operations across the ROMO. (2) 
 
18 Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, and Kassam, “Emotion and Decision Making.” 
19 Paul Zak. “How Stories Change the Brain.” Greater Good Magazine, December 17, 2013. 
https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/how_stories_change_brain. 
20 Haven, Story Smart, 59. 
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Literature review of academic publications focused on emotions-based psychology and 
communications theory. (3) Semi-structured discussions with Marine Corps officers from 
a range of military occupational specialties (MOS) focused on their MCPP and OIE 
planning experiences. The semi-structured discussions have an underlying theme of 
emotion-based planning with regards to intended and unintended audiences. In order to 
complete the semi-structured discussion process, analysis was conducted to identify trends 
in the planning experiences of the participants. 
F. PREVIEW OF FINDINGS 
The trend which appeared throughout the doctrine and publication review and the 
semi-structured discussions is that the Marine Corps does not adequately plan for 
emotional impacts on their audiences, thereby leading to a deficiency in shaping IE effects 
and causing a lack of control for Marine Corps narratives and perceptions. The literature 
review of military doctrine identified Information as pervasive across all aspects of military 
activities and something that must be accounted for in military planning. Within the 
academic literature, evidence supported the concept of emotions having a direct 
relationship to influence and decision making. Further, a strong relationship exists between 
story architecture and emotional influence in a target audience. Through the relationship 
of these findings, the author generated a planning addendum to aid USMC planning efforts 
in better controlling and planning for Information Environment impacts generated as a 
result of military activities. The end result of this thesis is a product coined the Emotion-
Centric Planning Process. This process is intended to be applied at battalion-level 
operations to foster a new approach to OIE in Marine Corps operations planners. This new 
mindset will proactively guide Marines to consider emotional factors of human observers. 
11 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is composed of two primary categories: (1) military doctrine 
and (2) academic literature. Within the military doctrine category, Joint as well as Marine 
Corps publications are referenced. The scope of material covered with the Joint and Marine 
Corps publications is focused on military operations planning, influence, and Operations 
in the Information Environment. For the academic literature, a breadth of practices is 
covered. These include psychology, sociology, communications theory, and narrative/story 
architecture design.  
Joint and Marine Corps doctrine provide the foundational understanding of OIE. 
Additionally, this thesis reviews and analyzes Joint and Marine Corps operational planning 
doctrine to best identify the current structures in place and all associated linkages where an 
ECPP could best be applied to ensure Information, as a warfighting function, is 
appropriately integrated. Within the academic literature review, a synopsis of each 
document is given defining that document’s relevance to this thesis. Additionally, each 
document within the military doctrine section has a Critical Themes synopsis. The Critical 
Themes synopsis serves as a brief and direct explanation of the specific document’s 
generalized themes regarding OIE, planning, and human emotional considerations. Each 
document is presented separately. This is done to maintain organization and simplify, for 
the reader, the conveyance of the critical themes extracted from each document. The OIE 
community is continuing to generate, update, and solidify new doctrine. Because of this, 
some of the terminology used here may have become outdated since the publication of each 
document. For continuity purposes, the discussion of each reviewed document will utilize 
the terminology which was current at the time of that document’s publication. 
A. JOINT DOCTRINE  
1. JP-3-0: Joint Operations  
JP 3-0 serves as the framework for joint operations and defines strategic-level 
warfighting concepts. Subsequently, all services within the Department of Defense nest 
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their operational planning doctrine under JP 3-0. Within JP 3-0, the seven joint warfighting 
functions are defined, to include the newest function: Information.  
JP 3-0 defines an important concept for the OIE community. The term relevant 
actor is defined as, “The human and automated systems whose behavior the JFC wants to 
affect.”21 For the scope of this thesis, the focus is on the human component of the relevant 
actors definition, more specifically, the emotional factor.  
Perhaps one of the most profound and relevant statements within JP 3-0 is, “All 
military activities produce information.”22 This concept is closely aligned to perception 
management and the concept of an audience always being present to observe and 
subsequently generate a perception, emotion, belief, or behavior response. However, while 
this statement is present in JP 3-0, there remains a disconnect between this doctrinal intent 
and what is actively conducted in the joint force on a daily basis. The Marine Corps has 
yet to fully grasp this statement and maintains a focus on traditional planning factors such 
as the “beans, bullets, and bandages,” requirements. The lack of OIE considerations from 
the onset of the planning process is the initiation of the gap this thesis looks to address.  
JP 3-0 further defines a major function of Information to be, “Leverage Information 
to Affect Behavior.”23 Under this function are three responsibilities. (1) Influence Relevant 
Actors, (2) Inform Domestic, International, and Internal Audiences, and (3) Attack and 
Exploit Information, Information Networks, and Systems.24 Responsibilities (1) and (2) 
share a common goal which is to steer perceptions in such a way as to garner positive favor 
from the relevant actors. Additionally, responsibility (1) states the joint force considers, 
regardless of mission, the impacts their operations will have regarding influence end 
states.25 Adherence to this concept during military planning will aid in achieving the 
 
21 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, III-18,  
22 Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-17. 
23 Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-19. 
24 Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-19. 
25 Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-19. 
13 
Commandant’s intent of fully integrating Information amongst the other warfighting 
functions.  
Defined in JP 3-0 are 11 capabilities which the joint force can utilize to leverage 
Information. Within the Marine Corps, these 11 capabilities are known as Information 
Related Capabilities (IRCs). The 11 capabilities are (1) Key Leader Engagements (KLE), 
(2) Public Affairs (PA), (3) Civil-Military Operations (CMO), (4) Military Deception 
(MILDEC), (5) Military Information Support Operations (MISO), (6) Operations Security 
(OPSEC), (7) Electronic Warfare (EW), (8) Combat Camera, (9) Space Operations, (10) 
Special Technical Operations (STO), and (11) Cyber Operations (CO).26 
It is important to note all 11 of these capabilities have their own doctrine and lines 
of authorities and permissions. All operations are to be planned in such a way as to benefit 
from the inherent informational aspects generated as a result of physical power so as to 
influence the TA.27 As explained in Chapter III’s research findings, this is where the 
current gap arises within Marine Corps operations planning and control over Information 
Environment impacts. Starting from the highest echelon of military planning guidance, 
there is a disconnect with the actual application of Information, as a warfighting function, 
to operations planning. The 11 capabilities are treated as separate operations while the 
inherent informational aspects of operations are neglected. In order to achieve successful 
OIE effects, planners must understand IRCs serve specific missions which require 
employment on a situationally-dependent basis while the inherent aspects of Information 
are present for every military activity.    
Within the overall Operating Environment (OE), applying Information, as a tool, 
to influence relevant actors’ perceptions and attitudes is an effective way to generate 
targeted behaviors from the relevant actor.28 What JP 3-0 does not do is describe or educate 
the reader on how to apply the IRCs to generate targeted behavior. In order to learn the 
 
26 Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-22 through III-26. 
27 Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-22. 
28 Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
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application of the IRCs, Marine Corps planners must resort to additional doctrine and 
leverage specially trained personnel.  
Critical Themes of JP 3-0: The concept of informational aspects resulting from 
physical power contains a key OIE concept. All activities will have an audience and 
therefore generate Information considerations. The audiences observing the activities may 
not be a specific Target Audience, nonetheless observations of military activities across the 
ROMO will be inevitable. This predicates the research of this thesis, providing CJCS-level 
acknowledgement and prioritization of Informational aspects to military planning and 
operations. The ever-present nature of Information is understood by the highest echelons 
of military command. This generates a need to consider every military activity as a 
potential OIE projectile, especially with the guidance in JP 3-0 to apply Information to 
influence relevant actor perceptions and attitudes. In a basic summation of this concept: if 
military activities generate information, and information is leveraged to influence relevant 
actors; then military activities influence relevant actors. 
2. JP 3-13: Information Operations  
As of 2021, JP 3-13 provides the most detail and explanation for Information 
Operations within the DOD. Although four years older than JP 3-0 and overdue for an 
update, this document includes similar information such as the definitions of the 
Information Related Capabilities (IRCs). This document is heavy in legal considerations 
and authorities that govern the use of IRCs and further explains the relationship between 
DOD Directive 3600.01, Information Operations and CJCS Instruction 3210.01, Joint 
Information Operations Policy. For the scope of this thesis, governing legal authorities will 
not be covered in-depth, however JP 3-13 remains a mandatory read for OIE professionals 
due to the legal consideration information. 
This document provides sound predication for the importance of Information and 
its increasingly dominant role in a world characterized by rapid emergence of technology. 
Included as an instrument of national power, Information is considered alongside 
diplomatic, military, and economic influence to provide international response tools for the 
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U.S. government.29 The global communications infrastructure has become increasingly 
interconnected as a result of higher data rates and the pervasive nature of the Internet of 
Things (IoT). In order to make sense of the massive and nebulous construct like the IoT 
and ever-present nature of Information, JP 3-13 expounds on the three dimensions of the 
Information Environment to give a tangible understanding to the topic. The three 
dimensions (see Figure 3) are the Cognitive, Informational, and Physical.30 The Physical 
Dimension is comprised, but not limited to, the networks, platforms, facilities, humans and 
leadership, and equipment necessary to facilitate information and data transfers.31 The JP 
3-13 definition of the Information Dimension bears striking similarities to the Physical 
Dimension. While the Informational Dimension is comprised of physical infrastructure 
such as the servers where data and information is stored, or the means in which information 
is collected, disseminated, and processed; this dimension is more focused on the 
information itself, and not the physical infrastructure.32 Additionally, the Informational 
Dimension can best be understood as a logical connection between the Physical Dimension 
and the Cognitive Dimension. The Cognitive Dimension represents the mind and “brain 
power” of the target audience.33 This dimension is where this thesis is focused. Within the 
Cognitive Dimension, influence variables reside to best apply influence techniques and 
specific IRCs. 
 
29 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, JP 3-13. (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2014), I-1, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_13.pdf. 
30 Joint Chiefs of Staff, X. 
31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-2. 
32 Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-3.  
33 Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-3. 
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Figure 3. Application of IRCs to Achieve Influence34 
JP 3-13 illuminates the complexity within which operations in the IE are planned 
and executed. The generalized theme proposed with JP 3-13 regarding IO planning is to 
bring together every persona and billet with a vested interest into a planning group or cell. 
While the defined IO Cell in JP 3-13 is derived from a Joint-level command, the essence 
of the structure and its roles is appropriate for a MEF-level staff. The IO Cell (see Figure 
4) depicts a 23-billet team which not only coordinates and deconflicts unit-internal 
capabilities, but external and U.S. Government efforts as well.35 This holistic approach to 
 
34 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-7. 
35 Joint Chiefs of Staff, II-6. 
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IO planning adequately factors all pertinent billets and capabilities. However, this structure 
is not perfectly suitable for all echelons of Marine Corps operations and planning. 
 
Figure 4. Information Operations Cell Construct36 
Critical Themes of JP 3-13: Below the MEF-level, manning and personnel 
restraints limit a unit’s ability to fully field an IO Cell. A MEF command or a deployed 
 
36 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, II-6. 
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Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) has the ability to man an IO Cell which aids in ensuring 
IRCs are applied correctly and Information Environment considerations are factored into 
operational planning. However, battalion-level commands across the Marine Corps are not 
adequately structured to maintain a standing IO Cell, nor field one on a case-by-case basis. 
This poses a risk to a large percentage of USMC training and operations occurring at the 
battalion and below levels. Audience observations are not exclusive to deployed or combat 
operations. Any echelon of command within the Marine Corps has the chance to have their 
military activities observed, thus leading to a vulnerability of uncontrolled perceptions 
promulgating through a human population. The current MEF Information Group (MIG) 
structure is an adequate MEF-level effort to produce a command which provides the same 
organizational benefits as a standing IO Cell. 
3. JP 3-13.2: Military Information Support Operations 
JP 3-13.2 is the first piece of doctrine which delves deep into the process which is 
used to influence a target audience. Broken down into seven phases, MISO is intended to 
develop, deliver, and coordinate influence messages to a target audience.37 The seven 
phases presented in JP 3-13.2, in chronological order are, 
1. Phase I: Planning 
2. Phase II: Target Audience Analysis 
3. Phase III: Series Development 
4. Phase IV: Product Development and Design 
5. Phase V: Approval 
6. Phase VI: Production, Distribution, and Dissemination 
7. Phase VII: Assessment38 
During Phase I, MISO planners must not only account for their MISO program’s 
support to the GCC, but to external entities as well. This can include embassy leadership 
and other government agencies (OGAs) to ensure a holistic Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) 
is promoted. The resounding theme for Phase I is similar to all planning phases across the 
 
37 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Information Support Operations, JP 3-13.2. (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2014), V-1, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_13.pdf.  
38 Joint Chiefs of Staff, V. 
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DOD. This theme is to always ensure the operation is deconflicted with adjacent units and 
nested under the intent of the commander.  
Target Audience Analysis (TAA) is an intelligence-heavy phase. While the MIG 
command did not exist during the initial publication year of JP 3-13, the MIG construct 
fortunately facilitates the Target Audience Analysis phase well. Each MEF has a MIG 
command; adjacent to the Division, Marine Logistics Group (MLG), and Marine Air Wing 
(MAW). The MIG is one of four Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) of the MEF. Two 
units subordinate to the MIG are critical to OIE and TAA: the Intelligence Battalion and 
the Radio Battalion. Both battalions contain intelligence collection and analytic capabilities 
which, in theory, will provide the technology, competency, and man-hours to conduct TAA 
on behalf of MEF influence operations.  
Phases III and IV are where the MISO process begins to formulate the potential 
COAs for the influence operation. During these phases, media venues, message suitability, 
message duration, and resources allocation are planned. After selecting the plausible COAs 
for the message, MISO planners then begin the fifth phase, Approval. Standard command 
hierarchy practices apply to Phase V in the same manner as any typical military 
organization.  
Phases VI and VII denote the Production, Distribution, and Dissemination; and 
Assessment phases, respectively.39 A major consideration with the Assessment phase is 
the understanding of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Measures of Performance 
(MOP) with regards to identifying the success of the MISO message. Evaluating success 
of a message meant to generate effects in a human’s mind is a difficult task. JP 3-13.2 
provides the following as potential venues to utilize in assessing MOEs and MOPs: 
intelligence products, public opinion data, focus groups, open-source data, and key leader 
engagements.40 
 
39 Joint Chiefs of Staff, V-7. 
40 Joint Chiefs of Staff, V-7. 
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Critical Themes of JP 3-13.2: This publication spends ample time covering the 
importance of intelligence support and other capability enablers necessary to create, 
disseminate, and evaluate an effective influence message. TA development and analysis is 
a scalable concept. Understanding the factors comprising the cognitive dimension of the 
target is a concept which transcends from the higher Joint level of operations down to a 
smaller USMC-specific scale. The standardized, seven-phase MISO process provides a 
logical and well-organized structure with which to build a very specific influence message. 
The MISO process is not the only activity the Marine Corps can leverage to influence a 
target audience. As covered in JP 3-0, military activities across the ROMO generate 
Information which is needed to influence TAs. By applying this concept to the MEFs, the 
available opportunities to influence TAs becomes abundant. Individual operations sections 
within subordinate MEF units can effectively plan for IE impacts of their activities and 
leverage the proposed ECPP to best factor human emotional considerations. The MIG 
command will then be afforded the means to increase the MEF’s Information Environment 
presence by maintaining cognizance and deconflicting the ECPP narratives which become 
standardized planning considerations within those smaller subordinate units. 
4. JP 5-0: Joint Planning 
“Rapid advancements in cyberspace and information capabilities such as artificial 
intelligence, digital editing, and Internet applications enable rapid sharing of information 
and narratives, from areas of conflict to national leaders and the global public.”41 JP 5-0 
covers two primary levels of planning: (1) the strategic level which directly aligns its 
responsibilities to the orders and intents of the Secretary of Defense and the President, and 
(2) the operational level where the strategic-level intents are translated into actionable 
military activities to ensure national interests in the specified COCOM.42 The stated 
importance of information capabilities is understood and factored at both levels of Joint 
 
41 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Planning, JP 5-0. (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), I-1, 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp50.pdf?ver=usfQpGSu65ateysmAng%3D%3D.  
42 Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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Planning. This is observed during the Commander’s Communication Synchronization 
process in which the Combatant Commanders ensure they deconflict and partner their 
efforts with the rest of the U.S. government, specifically the Department of State. During 
this process, all the major OIE themes are addressed to include synchronizing narratives, 
themes, messages, images, operations, and actions.43 
One of the most critical products resulting from JP 5-0 is the seven-step Joint 
Planning Process (see Figure 5). The Joint Planning Process (JPP) is not binding, but rather 
provides a logical problem-solving process which is applicable to all levels of military 
planning. When in a crisis, or severely restrained timeline, the JPP can be modified to meet 
the time constraints and limitations. This is a similar construct to the Marine Corps 
Planning Process being scaled to meet condensed timelines through the use of the Rapid 
Response Planning Process (R2P2). 
 
Figure 5. The Joint Planning Process44 
 
43 Joint Chiefs of Staff, II-10. 
44 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-11. 
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Critical Themes of JP 5-0: In efforts to fulfill the objectives of the two defined 
levels of planning, USMC equities can be deployed in support of operations within the 
COCOMs. Within JP 5-0, it is explicitly stated communication synchronizations 
considerations should be integrated in all joint military planning across the ROMO.45 At 
the joint level, this concept is feasible to achieve by forming IO Cells that can be fully 
manned and maintain liaison with other government agencies. Maintaining an IO Cell for 
a Marine Corps MEF would be most appropriate within the MIG command. Information 
Environment considerations which are factored during Joint Commander’s 
Communication Synchronizations are still applicable at lower-level operations, such as 
those planned and executed within the MEFs. 
5. Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment 
(JCOIE) 
Perhaps the most critically important document to the DOD’s OIE effort, the JCOIE 
blends military practice with philosophical principles surrounding the Information 
Environment. Stated in the JCOIE, “Every Joint Force action, written or spoken word, and 
displayed or relayed image has informational aspects that communicate a message or 
intent.”46 The JCOIE takes a holistic approach to not only defining the ever-present 
element of Information, but expounds on the implications of information power generated 
as a result of military activities.  
In an effort to further define the Information Environment, three new aspects are 
discussed which are common amongst both the Information Environment as well as the 
Operational Environment. The new aspects are, (1) Informational Aspects, (2) Physical 
Aspects, and (3) Human Aspects.47 In contrast to the original Information Environment 
model which is comprised of the Physical, Informational, and Cognitive dimensions; the 
 
45 Joint Chiefs of Staff, II-10. 
46 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE). 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), 14, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/ 
concepts/joint_concepts_jcoie.pdf. 
47 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3. 
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three new aspects are intended to have an analytical focus on the ways in which 
Informational, Physical, and Human considerations are interconnected.48 While each 
dimension within the IE is a fundamental component, the doctrinal explanations lack detail 
to their interconnectedness. The JCOIE addresses this issue through the three aspects which 
provide for a more usable construct which allows for a more fruitful TAA process to exist. 
Critical Themes of JCOIE: Imperative to the framework of this thesis, the JCOIE 
acknowledges and further validates the importance of informational aspects which are 
inherent in all military activities. All military activities will have observers. These 
observers will sense and analyze the informational aspects which leads to the observer 
assigning meaning to the military activity.49 A critical component to military planning is 
centered around the final meaning the observers assign to the activity. Influencing or 
guiding the potential meaning must be an included planning factor during the planning 
process; from the strategic Joint level to the battalion level within the Marine Corps. The 
Human Aspect is highly complex with a seemingly countless number of variables. In an 
effort to connect the end state of assigned meaning with TA observations, JCOIE utilizes 
the worldview concept. Worldview is defined in the JCOIE as, “A mental model of reality 
- a framework of ideas and attitudes.”50 Included in the JCOIE are four main cultural 
factors which form a person’s worldview: beliefs, values, narratives, and behaviors.51   
6. Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-
HAMO) 
The JC-HAMO provides valuable knowledge on the elements which shape human 
behavior. Similar to the JCOIE concept of worldview, the JC-HAMO utilizes the concept 
 
48 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4-5. 
49 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14. 
50 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15. 
51 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15. 
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of temporal lens (see Figure 6). The five defined elements of the temporal lens model are 
physical, social, psychological, informational, and cultural.52 
 
Figure 6. Temporal Lens Model53 
Each element in the temporal lens model serves a niche category of factors which 
ultimately define how a relevant actor or TA perceives their surroundings. The physical, 
social, informational, and cultural are all elements which denote external influences on the 
relevant actor. The psychological element is most appropriate for the scope of this thesis. 
Comprising this element are the life experiences, emotions, and mental health of a relevant 
actor.54 These factors aggregate to influence a relevant actor’s decision-making process. 
Critical Themes of JC-HAMO: The application of human aspects to military 
operations is well-captured in the JC-HAMO. Utilizing four key idea imperatives - identify, 
evaluate, anticipate, and influence; the JC-HAMO Operational Framework (see Figure 7) 
provides an organized process to affect relevant actors and TAs.55 Themes within the JC-
 
52 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO). 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016), https://nsiteam.com/social /wp-content/uploads/ 2017/01/
20161019-Joint-Concept-for-Human-Aspects-of-Military-Operations-Signed-by-VCJCS.pdf.  
53 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6. 
54 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7. 
55 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13. 
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HAMO Operational Framework are easily translated to USMC planning procedures. The 
framework is intelligence-heavy, bearing similar themes to TAA. What the JC-HAMO 
Operational Framework adds to DOD planning is a model which more effectively 
considers cognitive dimension variables. 
 
Figure 7. JC-HAMO Operational Framework56 
7. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum 
Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 begins by acknowledging Competition is not a binary 
concept where the U.S. is either at peace, or at war. Instead, Competition is a sliding scale 
which transcends across three distinct statuses of relationships. These three relationships 
 
56 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14. 
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are (1) cooperation, (2) competition below armed conflict, and (3) armed conflict; and can 
be concurrently occurring between the U.S. and a given actor.57 
Throughout the three relationships in the continuum, Information is most-heavily 
considered during competition below armed conflict. Specifically, this phase calls for joint 
force actions in the Information Environment to counter and undermine the adversary’s 
narratives.58 During this relationship in the continuum, it is imperative to utilize 
information capabilities to influence relevant actor behavior without crossing the threshold 
of armed conflict and inciting adversary response which would advance to kinetic 
hostilities.  
Critical Themes of Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: In the current global power arena, 
competition below armed conflict is common. The four elements of grand strategy - 
diplomacy, military, information, and economic are at constant play; being leveraged by 
the U.S. government daily. Influencing relevant actors or TAs through IRCs can aid the 
U.S. in shaping opinions and controlling narratives within the COCOMs. Additionally, 
USMC activities are dynamically employed across the ROMO. Effectively applying the 
information power generated from all of its activities down to the lowest echelons of 
command will forward the Marine Corps’ relevance in the Information Environment. 
B. MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE  
1. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting 
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP-1) is the bedrock document for the 
Marine Corps’ philosophy on warfare. Within MCDP-1 are four chapters, each dedicated 
to strategic-level concepts of warfighting. Throughout MCDP-1 is a recurring theme of the 
human factor and its unique variables which contribute to the complexity of warfare. 
 
57 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19. (Washington, DC: Joint  
Chiefs of Staff, 2019), 2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/ Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_19.pdf. 
58 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8. 
27 
Critical Themes of MCDP-1: MCDP-1 defines war as, “A clash between opposing 
human wills.”59 This grand concept implies there is ever-present uncertainty associated 
with the human variable. Critical to this thesis, MCDP-1 acknowledges how war will be 
shaped by the emotions of its human participants and further states the absence of human 
factor considerations in warfighting doctrine will render that doctrine inherently flawed.60 
Serving as one of the most prominent USMC publications, these concepts are echoed and 
implied throughout subordinate doctrine. 
2. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-10: Marine Corps Planning 
Process 
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-10 serves as the foundation to 
Marine Corps planning. The BAMCIS model of planning is sufficient for small-unit 
leadership within the Marine Corps while the MCPP is utilized to best foster joint planning 
efforts on behalf of the Marine Corps.61 For the scope of this thesis, understanding 
BAMCIS is related to small-unit leadership is sufficient. The squad, platoon, and 
potentially the company echelons of command would reference this model for tactical-
level planning. With regards to OIE and emotional influence considerations, the MCPP 
and its association at the battalion-level and higher is appropriate. 
The MCPP is comprised of six critical stages (see Figure 8). OIE has a role within 
each of the six steps. However, a lack of planning with regards to influence, relevant actors, 
and TA perceptions is characteristic within all of the six steps. The first glimpse of human 
considerations is shown within the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) 
process. While including human and Information Environment considerations within the 
MCPP is a positive, the planner is only accountable for these considerations as a result of 
a byproduct of the S-2 (Intelligence) shop. The S-2 provides categorical information 
 
59 Department of the Navy, Warfighting, MCDP-1. (Washington, DC: Headquarters United States 
Marine Corps, 1997), 13. 
60 Department of the Navy, 14. 
61 Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Planning Process, MCWP 5-10. (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2016). 
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regarding the human landscape of the battlespace, which will serve an additional OIE 
purpose of defining the relevant actors and target audience, but within the MCPP, this does 
nothing to plan OIE support and it does nothing to involve planners with the consideration 
of the inherent information aspects of their military activities. Operational planning factors 
for the physical domain are only present at this point in the planning process. 
 
Figure 8. Marine Corps Planning Process62 
Critical Themes of MCWP 5-10: Figures 9-11 are visual representations of the first 
three phases of the MCPP. Each step within the MCPP depicts the inputs needed for the 
specific step, the actions conducted within that step, and the final products delivered for 
completion of the step. It is important to note relevant actor and TA considerations are not 
explicitly recognized during the six steps of the MCPP. The IPB focuses more on 
Information Environment considerations which are referenced during planning, however 
the scope of these considerations are only data points to improve planning, not Information 
 
62 Source: Department of the Navy, 1. 
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Environment considerations focused on the inherent information impacts resulting from 
the MCPP-planned event itself. 
 
Figure 9. Marine Corps Planning Process - Problem Framing63 
 
63 Source: Department of the Navy, D-1. 
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Figure 10. Marine Corps Planning Process - COA Development64 
 
64 Source: Department of the Navy, D-2. 
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Figure 11. Marine Corps Planning Process - COA Wargaming65 
Another critical OIE process within the MCPP is the Areas and Structure, 
Capabilities, Organization, People, and Events (ASCOPE) model (see Figure 12). This 
model is utilized within the IPB process to provide a holistic understanding of the civil 
terrain the Marines will be operating within. This model not only provides planning details 
for the physical domain such as critical infrastructure, but it also accounts for planning 
variables pertinent to IE considerations. 
 
65 Source: Department of the Navy, D-3. 
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Figure 12. ASCOPE Model66 
3. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-32: Marine Air-Ground 
Task Force Information Operations 
MCWP 3-32 serves as a link between the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF) structure and the way in which Information, as a warfighting function, is 
theoretically integrated. This publication is heavily focused on explaining the integration 
of 13 IRCs. The 13 presented IRCs are generally present in most publications involving 
Information and OIE. They are Military Deception, Electronic Warfare, Operations 
Security, Military Information Support Operations. Cyberspace Operations, Physical 
Attack, Information Assurance, Physical Security, Counterintelligence, Public Affairs, 
Civil-Military Operations, Combat Camera, and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy.67 
 
66 Source: Department of the Navy, E-12. 
67 Department of the Navy, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations, MCWP 3-32. 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2018). 
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Of note, MCWP 3-32 marries the concept of OIE planning to the existing structure 
of the MCPP. Within the planning process for OIE support, the Future Operations (FOps) 
section of a command staff plays a critical role. Annotated in MCWP 3-32, the MAGTF 
IO officer within the FOps section is tasked with ensuring the following: 
• Integrating and coordinating IO efforts. 
• Responding directly to the commander via the G-3/S-3 for MAGTF 
information operations. 
• Ensuring that the IO cell is incorporated into and provides input to the 
operational planning team (OPT) during planning to ensure 
coordinated operations. 
• Preparing the IO appendix to the operation order (OPORD). 
• Directing personnel within the MAGTF IO cell as well as augmentees 
from external agencies who are assigned to the IO cell. 
• Ensuring that all information operations are coordinated within the 
MAGTF staff, higher headquarters, and external agencies. 
• Coordinating and collaborating with the intelligence staff section (G-2/
S-2).68 
With a staff officer dedicated to these functions, OIE is afforded a centralized 
touchpoint during the planning process to ensure different planning equities deconflict and 
coordinate operational efforts. In theory, this concept works well; especially when a single 
unit is organically manned with such positions as Public Affairs Officers, Electronic 
Warfare Officers, or Civil Affairs officers. In reality, battalion-sized units and below in the 
Marine Corps generally are not fielded with these niche staff officer billets. Instead, higher 
headquarters or the MIG would provide this support. 
Critical Themes of MCWP 3-32: During the Problem Framing planning phase, the 
IO concept of support is introduced. The IO concept of support serves two critical purposes. 
First, it forces the IO Officer in the FOps section to ensure the IO support is nested within 
the commander’s guidance. Second, the concept of support begins the process of 
identifying organic OIE capabilities and resources, as well as OIE deficiencies and what 
will need to be externally sourced.69 As the MCPP progresses, so does the IO concept of 
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support. MCWP 3-32 states when the operations planners develop multiple COAs, the 
MAGTF IO officer must develop IO concepts of support for each COA; answering the 
following requirements: 
• What IO tasks will be accomplished? 
• Who will execute the IO tasks (IO assets capabilities)? 
• When will IO tasks be executed? 
• Where will the IO task occur? 
• Why is each IO task required (intended effect)? 
• How will the MAGTF employ IRCs and other organic capabilities to 
accomplish the tasks? 
• How is the IO concept nested with the higher headquarters’ IO plan 
and scheme of maneuver?70 
With these requirements, OIE planning defines tangible benchmarks with which 
progress can be made in developing sufficient COAs. Essentially the “Five-Ws” of 
information, the IO concept of support aids planners to generate tangible OIE responses to 
the operational COAs planned by the rest of the staff sections. Critical to this thesis is the 
relationship the IO concept of support has with the operational COAs. This concept 
transcends all levels of command and is scalable to meet any commander’s operational 
intent. Whether a basic COA is generated to conduct a company-level training exercise, or 
an operation during armed conflict; the IO concept of support guides the OIE planning 
officer and OIE-related equities in clearly defining the appropriate scope and support 
needed to be integrated within the defined operation. 
4. Marine Corps Operating Concept for Information Operations 
Dated February 2013, the Marine Corps Operating Concept for Information 
Operations is slightly outdated. In comparison to MCWP 3-32: MAGTF IO, this document 
has differences in doctrinal definitions, but the variations in concept are minor enough to 
still convey similar OIE roles and responsibilities. This document contains and underlying 
theme which aligns OIE to combat operations and conflict actions. This is shown through 
 
70 Department of the Navy, 2-7. 
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the direct relationship describing IO as a natural extension and evolution of the combined 
arms and maneuverist mindsets.71  
Given the unique way in which Information can be incorporated as a warfighting 
function, multiple philosophies have formed throughout the DOD and USMC. One of these 
philosophies is centered on treating OIE as a form of non-kinetic fires. This causes 
juxtaposition to arise when relating an OIE activity to an act such as artillery fires, a 
traditional form of kinetic fires. Within this comparison, the Marine Corps Operating 
Concept for Information Operations identifies four unique traits of information in its 
application: 
• Information must compete for the attention of the intended target while 
fires have no such requirement. 
• Although the target of fires may have few choices about the effects to 
which it is subjected, the target of an information operation can choose 
what signals to heed or ignore through the application of social and 
cultural filters.  
• Although the effects of fires remain limited to targets within the 
designed radius of the ordnance, information effects can propagate 
well beyond the intended target and perhaps pick up strength, change, 
and create unintended consequences. 
• Although the physical effects of fires are self-demonstrating, 
information must be interpreted by their target, which does so 
according to its own frame of reference.72 
Critical Themes of Marine Corps Operating Concept for Information 
Operations: The four unique traits of information are comprised of communications 
theory, psychological, and sociological concepts. Regardless of the OIE activity’s scale, 
these four traits apply to the human variable of the target audience. TAA and the 
understanding of communications channels play a critical role when defining information 
as a form of non-kinetic fires. These four traits are critical to understanding the effects of 
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non-kinetic fires in the Information Environment, but the Marine Corps Operating Concept 
for Information Operations does not effectively convey the ways in which to control them. 
Within the academic literature review section of Chapter II, explanation will be given to 
the means in which the Marine Corps can more effectively dictate these four unique IO 
traits.    
5. Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Environment Operations 
Concept of Employment  
This document is results-driven, identifying milestones and major organizational 
factors required to bring the Marine Corps up-to-speed by providing a structure dedicated 
to Information Environment responsibilities. This document provided the initial detail 
necessary to develop and create the MIG. The MIG is the highest echelon of command 
within a MEF which primarily focuses on Information as a warfighting function. Depicted 
in Figure 13 is the MIG command structure. Each battalion within the MIG provides 
technical and niche capabilities to not only the MIG, but the entire MEF. For the scope of 
this thesis, the MIG HQ, Intelligence Battalion, and Radio Battalion perform the most vital 
roles. The roles of the MIG HQ, Radio Battalion, and Intelligence Battalion house the 
personnel, command billets, and military occupational specialties (MOSs) necessary to 




Figure 13. MIG Command Structure73 
Within the Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Environment Operations 
Concept of Employment, seven distinct Information Environment functions are defined 
(see Figure 14). This is critical to USMC OIE efforts because it provides achievable and 
defined missions with which to leverage resources and manpower to achieve effects in the 
Information Environment. The defining characteristic of these seven functions is how, 
given varying degrees of mission contexts, the function purpose remains the same. 
 
73 Source: Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Marine Air Ground Task 
Force Information Environment Operations Concept of Employment. (Arlington, VA: Headquarters United 




Figure 14. Information Environment Operations Functions74 
The IE Ops Functions, coupled with the MIG command structure provide a rational 
construct to organize and make actionable the OIE capabilities. Throughout most military 
documents reviewed for this thesis, the IRCs are typically highlighted as the dominant 
means of generating Information impacts. What the Marine Air Ground Task Force 
Information Environment Operations Concept of Employment does is provide a rational 
institutional response to the statement from JP 3-0, “All military activities produce 
information.”75 All other MSCs within a MEF conduct military activities across the 
ROMO, generating Information Environment impacts. Each of these MSCs maintains its 
own COC. The MIG COC serves as the central node for integrating the seven IE Ops 
Functions across all other command and control nodes within the MEF.76 This line-and-
block approach to organizing information flow enables the MEF to coordinate and 
deconflict the information generated as a result of the MEF’s military activities. 
 
74 Source: Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, 2. 
75 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, III-17. 
76 Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, 7. 
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Maintaining cognizance of the MEF’s military activities is not the only role the 
MIG HQ and MIG COC should be conducting. Providing constant situational awareness 
of the Information Environment is a daunting task, but one which must be carried out in an 
effort to provide commanders and key decision makers with timely, relevant, and accurate 
information. The IE Ops Running Estimate (see Figure 15) is a critical product defined in 
the Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Environment Operations Concept of 
Employment. The running estimate was a concept generated to directly solve an existing 
USMC deficiency: a commander’s need to own a touchpoint of centralized and 
comprehensive information to understand the Information Environment of their AORs.77 
 
Figure 15. IE Ops Running Estimate Concept78 
Critical Themes of Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Environment 
Operations Concept of Employment: What is displayed in this document is a holistic 
approach to MEF-level OIE organization. The details provided for the MIG command 
construct and MIG COC address the requirement for maintaining persistent situational 
 
77 Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, 18. 
78 Source: Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, 18. 
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awareness of the Information Environment. The structural design of the MIG command 
allows for an organized effort in integrating the seven IE Ops Functions across MEF 
operations. In the process of integrating the seven functions, the MIG ensures the six 
operational capability areas (see Figure 16) are leveraged to achieve the seven functions.79 
 
Figure 16. Six Operational Capability Areas of IO80 
Influence Operations and Inform Operations are the two capability areas most 
aligned to the premise of this report. Both functions have a strong focus on TAs and the 
utilization of information as a means to influence the cognitive dimension within human 
relevant actors. By integrating with the rest of MEF staff and planners, the MIG maintains 
cognizance of all MEF military activities. As the MEF activities are conducted, audiences 
are observing and processing their observations in the cognitive dimension. In the absence 
of appropriate unit-level OIE planning factors, the MEF activities are uncontrolled OIE 
projectiles. An organizational benefit would arise from the delegation of the Influence and 
Inform capability areas to smaller unit operational staffs. These two areas have an inherent 
nature of observation which cannot be eliminated. The greatest bid for success in obtaining 
holistic control of a MEF’s Information Environment impacts is to integrate the Influence 
and Inform concepts into the initial stages of operational planning, most appropriately at 
the battalion level. 
 
79 Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, 22. 
80 Source: Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, 23. 
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C. SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE  
1. Diffusion of Innovations 
Backed with a significant amount of case studies and anecdotal evidence, Diffusion 
of Innovations effectively explains the process by which ideas promulgate throughout a 
human population. The process of diffusion is intimately associated with Information 
Environment elements, especially those comprising the cognitive dimension. Rogers’ 
Diffusion concept is comprised of four main elements: 
• The Innovation 
• Communications Channels 
• Time 
• A Social System81 
When analyzed together, these four elements provide the lifespan of a message. In 
the scope of OIE and this thesis, these elements must be identified for each TA that will 
observe Marine Corps activities. Once the TA observes the activity, their perception will 
be formulated and then begin the diffusion life cycle. TAA conducted by intelligence 
professionals should identify defining characteristics of the communications channels used 
by the TA, the social system and cultural idiosyncrasies which the TA belongs to, and an 
assessment of the time necessary for the innovation to promulgate throughout the TA. After 
the refinement of these three elements, the innovation can be created. For this report, the 
innovation will be synonymous with the OIE message.  
Rogers breaks down the adopters of an innovation into five separate categories: 
Innovators, Early Adopters, Early Majority, Late Majority, and Laggards.82 Each of these 
typecasts of individuals are defined by unique character traits which influence the rate at 
which they adopt new technologies or beliefs. Having the ability to conduct a thorough 
TAA will allow Marine Corps planners to identify the innovators within a population, 
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82  Rogers, 282-285. 
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thereby facilitating a more specific message and generate a higher percentage of success 
with getting the desired message into a system. 
Innovators comprise approximately 2.5% of a population; display risky, 
venturesome character traits; and are usually the entry point into a system of people who 
adopts the innovation from an external system.83 Early Adopters represent 13.5% of a 
population; are generally well-respected by peers within their social system; and serve to 
push the acceptance of an innovation to “critical mass” as a result of accepting and then 
publicly endorsing the innovation.84 While all five categories of adopters are important; 
within the realm of OIE, it is assessed Innovators and Early Adopters would be the most 
lucrative TAs given their critical roles in promoting the message. 
2. Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion  
Dr. Robert Cialdini intuitively and methodically defines six influence techniques 
which shape human-to-human interaction. Of note, this book does not delve deeply into 
emotional considerations and is not explicit in describing emotional responses to the 
techniques. However, Dr. Cialdini’s book is predicated on a very powerful mechanic of 
human behavior: trigger features. Another way to title his six influence techniques, 
Cialdini’s six triggers are unique social behaviors which have been observed to generate 
frequently consistent responses from the target. In essence, one of these six techniques is 
put into play and the target’s mind is “triggered” to begin performing a near-automatic and 
predictable response relative to the technique chosen.  
The primary benefit of this reading is an explanation of the application and 
reasoning to the success of the six influence techniques. These techniques define basic 
human behaviors and can aid in predicting responses to OIE messaging. Dr. Cialdini’s six 
techniques are: Reciprocation, Commitment and Consistency, Social Proof, Liking, 
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Authority, and Scarcity.85 While these are not military doctrinal terms, they have been 
proven to elicit emotional responses from individuals - a benefit which is directly 
applicable to the fifth OIE Operational Function: Influence Foreign Target Audiences. 
These six techniques may serve as a quick reference for novice OIE planners in 
understanding generalized influence and response concepts.  
3. Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion 
Citing Dr. Cialdini’s influence techniques, Drs. Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot 
Aronson build upon these concepts in the realms of persuasion and influence. In Age of 
Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion, Pratkanis and Aronson detail 
the emotional and psychological responses of these techniques as well as validate two 
critical themes linked to OIE and influence. Pratkanis and Aronson connect effective 
influence to TA emotion, as well as provide four characteristics of effective messaging: 
• The message must attract the recipient’s attention. 
• The arguments in the message must be understood and comprehended. 
• The recipient must learn the arguments contained in the message and 
come to accept them as true. 
• Finally, the recipient of the messages acts on this learned knowledge 
when there is an incentive to do so.86 
These four criteria can easily be transposed into the military OIE realm and serve 
as a simplistic guide to defining successful influence operations. This concept is enhanced 
by the addition of targeting relevant actor emotions. Effective influence impacts emotions 
leading the target to pursue relief of a negative emotion, or sustainment of a positive one.87  
Pratkanis and Aronson capture the importance of human emotions in decision 
making. During the latter part of Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of 
Persuasion, special attention is given to fear and its effectiveness with eliciting behavior 
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responses. The authors reference psychological studies conducted by Dariusz Dolinski and 
Richard Nawrat as well as Howard Leventhal. With Dolinski and Nawrat, the two 
researchers would watch a crosswalk for jaywalkers and subsequently blow a police 
whistle to momentarily instill fear in the subject.88 The two would then confront the 
jaywalkers and ask for their compliance in answering a questionnaire. The two identified 
that when levels of fear spiked and were then relieved; the subjects complied with the 
questionnaire request significantly more than the jaywalkers who did not receive a fake 
police officer whistle blast.89 Their overall conclusion was the spike in fear, followed by 
subsequent relief caused the individual to be distracted from fully analyzing the request, 
leading to more compliance.90   
Howard Leventhal and a team of researchers further identified that not only 
arousing fear in subjects, but coupling it with detailed instructions on how to take action 
and resolve that fear led to a remarkable increase in actual behavior of the subjects.91 
Conducting a study with college students, Leventhal and team advertised a tetanus shot 
campaign. During this campaign, there were three groups - one group received high-fear 
advertisements about tetanus as well as detailed instructions on how to get the shot; a 
second group only received the high-fear advertisement; and the final group did not receive 
the high-fear advertisement, only the detailed instructions.92 Out of the three groups, the 
fear and instruction group produced a 28% success rate of getting the shots; the fear-only 
group had a 3% success rate, and the instruction-only group was 0%.93 
This evidence further backs the earlier statement by Pratkanis and Aronson that 
humans wish to alleviate negative emotions while prolonging positive ones. By instigating 
a negative emotion to trigger and subsequently detailing the remedy for that specific 
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emotion, one can increase the probability of generating behavior actions. In the scope of 
this thesis and OIE, the desired behavior of the TA would be the action within the detailed 
instructions provided in a well-crafted influence message.  
In an effort to effectively target emotions, building commonalities and a sense of 
“one-ness” with others aids the process. Identified by Henri Tajfel, the minimum group 
paradigm concept repeatedly shows complete strangers, when given trivial commonalities 
amongst themselves, tend to behave favorably towards and have better perceptions of their 
in-group and display opposite behavior and beliefs towards members of the out-group.94 
This persuasive technique is powerful and capitalizes on mankind’s social nature. The 
desire to belong and be accepted, the emotional response of happiness resulting from 
inclusion or celebrating the in-group’s success - this concept leverages everyone’s inherent 
desire for higher self-esteem. 
4. Story Smart: Using the Science of Story to Persuade, Influence, 
Inspire, and Teach 
In order for an audience to be influenced by a message, they must remain engaged. 
One of the best ways to maintain engagement is through emotional involvement. Through 
neural lab research, Dr. Kendall Haven identified emotional involvement and engagement 
had a positive correlation.95 He and his team observed subjects who displayed three traits 
simultaneously: active physiological indicators of engagement; active neurological 
signatures associated to engagement; and active neurological signatures of emotional 
involvement.96 This is a critical concept for OIE. To make this concept more tangible, this 
report will utilize three definitions from Kendall Haven that form a cascading relationship 
with each other: 
• Engagement: Emotionally laden attention. 
• Attention: Dedicated mental focus over time. 
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• Influence: Changing another person’s beliefs, attitudes, values, 
knowledge, or behavior.97  
In order to influence a target with a message, the target’s attention must be captured 
for a period of time so as to receive and begin synthesizing the message. In order to 
maintain capture and maintain attention, the target must be engaged with the message. For 
a target to be truly and most-effectively engaged, they must be emotionally stimulated by 
the message. 
At the heart of Story Smart are four major elements this report benefits from. The 
Neural Story Net (NSN), the Make-Sense Mandate, the eight essential elements of a story, 
and the Main Story Line. The NSN is an explanation as to why all human brains think in 
story form. Before any sensory perceptions make it to the conscious part of the brain, they 
must first be triaged by the subconscious part.98 This subconscious part is what Kendall 
Haven termed the NSN. The NSN utilizes story structure to rationalize the incoming 
sensory information into a situation we understand and then relay the sensical situation to 
the conscious part of the brain.99 The drive to rationalize the situation is so intense that the 
NSN will generate assumptions, generate new information and details to fill the gaps, and 
even ignore received information. This neurological need to understand is called the Make 
Sense Mandate.100 The NSN and Make Sense Mandate comprise a fundamental planning 
concern for OIE: the crafted message intended for the TA is not guaranteed to be the 
message they receive and understand. NSN activity will force the TA to add, subtract, and 
shuffle prior knowledge, experiences, and conceptual relationships to modify the message 
so it makes sense to them. 
Because the NSN works utilizing story structure - a structure refined over thousands 
of years of human development, the use of story structure to craft a message is a form of 
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backwards planning. To craft a message using story structure, Dr. Haven’s eight essential 
elements are needed: 
1. Characters: The characters that populate essential character positions 
in the story. 
2. Traits: Selected elements of character description used to control 
receiver attitude toward, and relationship to, story characters. 
3. Goal: What a character needs/wants to do/ get in a story. 
4. Motives: The sets of drivers that make a goal important to a character. 
Goals and motives are the primary source of story suspense.  
5. Conflicts and Problems: The sets of obstacles that stand between a 
character and an established goal and block that character from 
reaching the goal.  
6. Risk and Danger: The likelihood of failure (risk) and the consequences 
of failure (danger) created by problems and conflicts that a character 
must face. Risk and danger are the primary source of story excitement. 
Excitement and suspense are the primary sources of story tension.  
7. Struggles: The sequence of events a character undertakes (struggles) to 
reach a goal highlighted by the climax scene (confrontation with the 
last and greatest obstacle) and the resolution scene.  
8. Details: The character-, sensory-, scenic-, and event-specific 
descriptors used to create, direct, and control receivers’ story 
imagery.101 
When these eight elements are completed, the necessary information is provided to 
engage a target. After the elements are completed, the Main Story Line can be formed. The 
Main Story Line (see Figure 17) is the message crafter’s vehicle to release the message to 
the TA. Although not depicted, all eight elements are present within a completed Main 
Story Line. Instead of laying out the eight elements, the Main Story Line focuses heavily 
on the progression of the characters with the details, struggles, risk and danger, conflicts 
and problems, and traits as assumed additions included to form a final well-crafted story. 
 
101 Haven, 67. 
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Figure 17. Dr. Kendall Haven’s Main Story Line Concept102 
5. Story Proof: The Science Behind the Startling Power of Story 
The second Dr. Haven book included in this report is comprised of a career’s worth 
of scientific research; both first-hand as well as analysis and reviews of findings from six 
different fields of study. Dr. Haven’s work is structured into four principal themes: what 
defines a story, the relationship of story to the mind and brain, mind mechanics, and 
concluding with scientific research studies validating his story structure concepts.  
There are two vital concepts within Story Proof that lend credence to the importance 
of storytelling as a form of influence. The first is a set of seven governing principles which 
the conscious human mind abides by to process incoming information. The second is a list 
of 11 mental techniques identified by Dr. Haven and researchers to be active within the 
subconscious mind to facilitate the functioning of the seven principles. Dr. Haven’s seven 
governing principles explained are: 
1. Our experiences physically construct neural maps within the brain, 
forming a type of quick-reference model which we use to interpret 
new inputs. 
2. The human mind requires the information being processed to make 
sense. We will perform a number of mental processes to provide 
rationalization to the information we are given. 
 
102 Source: Haven, 107. 
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3. The human mind requires meaning and will make assumptions to 
formulate it from the presented narrative.  
4. When observing a character, the human mind assumes their actions are 
driven by a specific intent.  
5. Incomplete information is normal, leading to the gaps being quickly 
filled by pre-existing stereotypes and understood situational rules to 
make sense of the situation. 
6. Viewing narratives from the perspective of a character more 
effectively promotes understanding of the message withing the 
narrative. 
7. Character conflict and struggle generates meaning for the person 
receiving the narrative.103  
Dr. Haven’s 11 techniques are: 
1. Assumptions 
2. Cheat Sheets 
3. Expectations 
4. Inference 
5. Pattern Matching 
6. Prior Knowledge 
7. Binary Opposition 
8. Blending 
9. Language and Syntax Rules 
10. Emotions Rule 
11. Details104 
In relation to OIE and the scope of this thesis, not all 11 techniques will be covered. 
Instead, this report will focus on a select few which bolster the effectiveness of OIE 
messaging in its context of the ECPP. Prior Knowledge, Inference, Assumptions, 
Expectations, and Cheat Sheets are all closely associated to a TA’s Temporal Lens, a 
critical component of Target Audience Analysis.  
Prior Knowledge is essentially a summation of all things learned by an individual. 
Human interactions, experiences, education, and social observations build an individual’s 
repository of information with which they view the world. From a person’s prior 
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knowledge, they can apply existing standards and lessons learned from previous 
experiences to fill in information gaps of a situation. The application of this prior 
knowledge comes in the forms of inference, assumptions, expectations, and cheat sheets. 
Although similar, inference and assumptions differ in that inference is a logically-based 
process leading to a judgement or decision while the assumption process also leads to a 
judgement or decision, but is a more cavalier mental event where supporting evidence is 
not required.105 
Expectations serve as a filter for a person going throughout their daily life. All of 
us have developed generalized understandings of our surroundings and a basic, “The way 
things are,” mentality. When an observation falls outside of the realm of what is defined as 
a normal expectation, then the triggering event becomes flagged for our conscious mind to 
pay attention to it.106 Also known as neural maps or neural schema, cheat sheets serve as 
neural shortcuts; linking fragmentary pieces of information together utilizing applicable 
prior knowledge references.107 
As described, the five chosen techniques share strong commonalities in their 
definitions and share conceptual overlaps in the way they fill in the gaps caused by 
fragmented information. The most OIE-applicable theme amongst them is that in order to 
effectively leverage these techniques through OIE messaging, the audience must be defined 
and understood. The audience’s Temporal Lens must be defined in such a way that the 
prior knowledge repositories are identified. A thorough TAA process must identify the 
psychological, informational, cultural, physical, and social elements which contribute to 
the development of an individual’s prior knowledge. 
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6. Dr. Paul Zak’s Research Findings 
Dr. Paul Zak and his research team, along with funding from the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) identified very strong correlation between story 
structure and brain chemical response. Dr. Zak discovered two major requirements that 
comprised an effective story. The story must gain and maintain an audience’s attention, 
and the story must “transport” the audience into the world of the character.108 In essence, 
stories foster the following series of events to transpire with an audience.109 First, when a 
human is focused and pays attention, signs of mental arousal begin and stress hormones 
become produced. Secondly, after attention has been focused long enough, a process called 
“transportation” occurs during which the human empathizes with the character of the story. 
During his work with DARPA, Dr. Zak presented his subjects with a heart-
wrenching and climactic video in which a young boy named Ben was dying of cancer, and 
Ben’s father who was narrating the video and discussing the difficulty of coping with the 
scenario. The subjects who observed the video were documented as expressing the distress 
and empathy emotions.110 Through blood sampling, Dr. Zak identified the brain produced 
Cortisol, which correlated to the distress emotion, leading to added focus on the specific 
stimuli of the distress; and Oxytocin, which correlated to the empathetic emotion.111 
Further, Zak and team went on to re-run the study with the added measurements of 
heartrate, skin conductance, and breathing patterns. There were now two groups of subjects 
- those who witnessed the heart-wrenching and climactic video, and those watching a less-
eventful video of Ben and his father walking in a zoo. The audience with the zoo video 
quickly lost attention, while those with the climactic video registered distress and empathy 
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responses.112 After measuring levels of Oxytocin and Cortisol, the team was able to predict 
with 80% accuracy which subjects would be influenced to donate part of their research 
payments to a charity after the conclusion of watching the video.113 
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III. SEMI-STRUCTURED DISCUSSION RESEARCH 
Joint and Marine Corps planning and OIE doctrine consistently acknowledged 
human emotional considerations with regard to military operations. However, detail is 
lacking in doctrinal guidance regarding the actual efforts necessary to facilitate emotional 
considerations. Neurological psychology studies have shown a direct, positive correlation 
between emotional involvement and mental engagement in test subjects. With regards to 
influencing a target audience, the crafter of the message must engage the audience in such 
a manner as to retain that audience’s attention. This is a foundational element to the fifth 
function of OIE: Influence Foreign Target Audiences. The audience must be emotionally 
engaged to receive and respond to the message. A gap in USMC OIE capabilities is the 
lack of attention and resources given to crafting an OIE message focused on most-
effectively engaging a target’s emotions.  
JP 3-0 states, “All military activities produce information.”114 This concept 
predicated the series of questions which were asked during all semi-structured discussions. 
The intent of the discussions was to identify the frequency of Marine officers’ planning 
experiences with regards to OIE considerations. More specifically, when and how did they 
factor human emotion into their military plans and operations? The statement from JP 3-0 
is profound and encompasses all aspects of the armed services. Large-scale combat 
operations only account for a small percentage of active military activities. The majority 
of the military is engaged in the “train, man, and equip” processes of maintaining a standing 
military. Small-unit training events, humanitarian operations, and Theater Security 
Cooperation (TSC) operations are more frequent in today’s global political climate than 
declared combat operations. All of these other-than-combat activities generate information, 
as defined by JP 3-0. Through the conduct of the semi-structured discussions, it was 
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identified how battalion-level and below units incorporated human emotional 
considerations in their other-than-combat activities. 
A. SEMI-STRUCTURED DISCUSSION METHOD 
 Ten Marine officers took part in independent semi-structured discussions 
with the author of this report. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, all discussions were 
conducted via Microsoft Teams. Each participant in the study volunteered freely by 
responding to an initial email soliciting research participation. Participants included four 
USMC majors and six USMC captains representing six different military occupational 
specialties across each of the major subordinate commands of a MEF: the Division, the 
Marine Logistics Group, and the Marine Aircraft Wing. The following series of questions 
was standardized and used during the conduct of all ten discussions. 
1. Explain the TO/TE structure of the command. 
• Has the unit modified the TO/TE structure to fit its specific context? If so, 
describe the modifications? 
• What is your specific billet within your unit?  
• Where within the described command does it reside?  
• What are the duties of your billet?  
• What considerations does your billet incorporate regarding a target 
audience’s emotion? 
• What considerations does the unit have regarding a target audience’s 
emotion when conducting its mission?  
2. What doctrine dictates the unit’s activities regarding Influence 
Operations? 
• Describe how this doctrine dictates and/or guides the unit (or your billet) 
with regards to emotional management of the unit’s/billet’s audience? 
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3. Who does the unit support as its customers? (i.e., does the unit align its 
support to other specific units, areas of operation (AOs), or specific 
mission sets?)  
• When supporting its customers, how does the unit factor its target 
audience’s emotions into the planning and conduct phases of the support? 
• How does the unit assess effectiveness of its message with regards to 
audience emotion? 
• Describe how the unit provides OIE support (emphasis on emotional 
management) in the following two statuses: (1) A forward-deployed 
status. (2) A reach-back/garrison status. 
4. Does the unit have OIE-specific requirements? (not PIRs or CCIRs) 
• If “Yes,” what office or OPR generated them?  
• If “Yes,” how many have terminology related to “emotion(s)?” 
5. Describe the unit’s process for crafting an OIE message. 
• Does the unit’s process include differences based on short-term and long-
term timelines with regards to crafting an IE Ops message? 
6. Has the unit documented any additional observations with regards to the 
concept of human emotion and its relation to IE Ops planning? If so, 
describe them? 
B. SEMI-STRUCTURED DISCUSSION FINDINGS 
After conducting all ten semi-structured discussions, the responses were reviewed 
and analyzed to identify the presence of any themes. The following themes were identified. 
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• In general, at the battalion and company levels within the Marine Corps, 
there is an absence of emotional considerations of a target audience when 
planning and executing operations. 
• Without being fully aware of doing it, company-level and battalion-level 
leadership do consider OIE variables in their operations. These OIE 
variables are focused on maintaining a positive USMC perception from 
the local population. A culture fostered by Marine Corps leadership 
centered on the narrative of every Marine being an ambassador of the 
Marine Corps and an ambassador of the United States promotes small-unit 
leadership and actions to ensure pro-Marine Corps perceptions are 
generated as a result of Marine Corps activities.  
• For those who answered in the affirmative to Question 4, the theme 
identified was their units focused on Operational Security and Information 
Security requirements. OIE planning considerations concerning human 
emotional factors and influence considerations were absent in battalion 
and company-level planning. 
• Regarding OIE doctrine and guiding policy, the Marines who participated 
in the discussions shared similar experiences. Commander’s guidance was 
the primary authority and focused on perceptions generated by Marines’ 
good order and discipline and professional competency being publicly 
displayed.  
The results of the semi-structured discussions identified battalion and company-
level military activities are absent of human emotional considerations. However, there are 
indications OIE has been partially integrated into Marine Corps operational planning 
processes, even if it is in a limited capacity. Minor considerations of perception and 
perception management are interconnected with small-unit leadership and company-grade 
officer guidance. Additionally, Operational Security and Information Security themes 
appeared common in most of the semi-structured discussion responses. 
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The semi-structured discussion results combined with the literature review suggest 
an absence of OIE doctrine at the battalion and company-level operations planning sections 
is directly related to the absence of TA emotional considerations. Through the lack of 
doctrine, the Marine Corps is not capitalizing on the massive amount of information 
generated as a result of its battalion-and-below military activities.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The ECPP is derived from Dr. Kendall Haven’s Main Story Line process. The Main 
Story Line does not perfectly overlay on Marine Corps planning or OIE doctrine however, 
the utilization of the Main Story Line follows story architecture, which is proven to engage 
a target audience’s attention, foster emotional investment, and subsequently expose the 
audience to receive and synthesize a desired message. The Main Story Line is adjusted to 
most appropriately align with inherent Marine Corps planning procedures stemming from 
the MCPP. 
There are two echelons within a MEF that benefit from the proposed ECPP. The 
first echelon is the battalion. This unit is the intended user of the ECPP, incorporating this 
process into their battalion-level organic operational planning procedures. The company-
grade officers and staff non-commissioned officers, as well as the battalion commander 
and battalion operations staff will be afforded the opportunity to craft and organize 
appropriate emotions-driven narratives for their operations and training evolutions. All 
they must do is follow the ECPP timeline and template and input their OIE considerations. 
The second echelon benefitting from the ECPP is the MIG. While not the command 
focused on completing the requirements within the ECPP, the MIGs will receive digital 
copies routed to them through the appropriate chains of command. Theoretically, every 
battalion would apply the use of the ECPP to their operational planning processes. 
Whenever an event begins to be planned at a battalion, they will commence the ECPP in 
conjunction with their organic planning processes. While completing the ECPP, the 
battalion operations officer will be required to provide their operational details, to include 
the intended story structure details for emotional considerations, to the MIG. The MIG will 
then be able to take the information provided to them and update their MIG COC, 
maintaining positive accountability of their respective MEF’s planned operations. This will 
be conducted in conjunction with the MIG, as a major subordinate command, already 
maintaining liaison and a close working relationship with the MEF G-3 operations and 
planning shops. Since the MIG maintains many of the personnel trained and authorized to 
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execute the IRCs, this proactive feeding of information from the battalions will allow the 
MIG to “reach down and pull up” opportunities which it can then leverage its IRC-
approved personnel to capitalize upon. Finally, the MIG will have the necessary 
information to update the IE Ops Running Estimate product.  
In essence, the ECPP allows the MIGs to passively receive all subordinate MEF 
battalion’s operations and OIE plans. While the MIG manages the MEF CG’s overall intent 
for MEF perceptions and messaging, the MIG will now have an abundance of emotionally-
focused narratives supplied to them for larger MEF-level exploitation and broadcast. With 
the MIG controlling the holistic MEF OIE mission, the MIG can subsequently deconflict 
and coordinate the messages provided in the ECPP. Additionally, pending delegated 
authority from the MEF CG, the MIGs can modify, cancel, or combine battalion-level 
ECPP narratives.  
A secondary benefit to an ECPP incorporated at the battalion level is the hardening 
of Marines to adversary emotional manipulation. Similar to annual training requirements 
and the manner in which Marines are sensitized over a prolonged period of time to the 
lessons-learned from the training requirements; so too will Marines become more aware of 
Information Environment concerns. The ethos of, “Every Marine is a rifleman,” echoes 
across the Marine Corps because it is engrained into the identity of each Marine from the 
first day they commission or enlist. It is subsequently readdressed each year through annual 
pistol and rifle range qualifications. So too must Marines become proficient in Information. 
A consistent reminder of OIE considerations throughout all operations and training 
planning will afford the individual Marine ample time to consider the Information 
Environment and the impacts within their daily duties. 
It is important to understand each battalion will have its own internal planning 
procedures, most likely dictated by the battalion commander or battalion operations officer. 
However, even though these internal procedures and policies exist, they will still be rooted 
in the MCPP. Not every stage of the MCPP is appropriate for the ECPP to be integrated, 
and the ECPP is not limited to only being applied within the framework of the MCPP. The 
purpose of the ECPP is to frontload the planning process with a realistic and user-friendly 
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addendum to help plan for IE impacts generated from audience observations. In doing this, 
planners are better postured to consider audience emotional responses and shape those 
responses to achieve desired behaviors. 
A. PROPOSED ECPP 
Recalling from Chapter II, the MCPP is partitioned into six distinct phases. The 
most critical phases where the ECPP should be applied are Phase 1: Problem Framing (see 
Figure 18), Phase 2: COA Development (see Figure 19), and Phase 3: COA Wargaming 
(see Figure 20). During Phases 2 and 3 of the MCPP, planners generate multiple COAs to 
present the commander with options. The ECPP needs to coincide with all potential COAs 
to ensure its message aligns with the commander’s intent of all viable operational options. 
As these three phases are conducted, the ECPP Narrative Templates can be adjusted to best 
align with the specific COA it is aligned.   
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Figure 18. MCPP Phase 1 with ECPP Considerations Annotated.115 
 
115 Adapted from Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Planning Process. 
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Figure 19. MCPP Phase 2 with ECPP Considerations Annotated.116 
 
116 Adapted from Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Planning Process. 
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Figure 20. MCPP Phase 3 with ECPP Considerations Annotated.117 
During IPB in Phase 1, Intelligence analysts should utilize the ASCOPE method 
referenced in Chapter II, as well as the Temporal Lens concept to identify critical human 
variables which define the cognitive dimension of the desired Target Audience. The 
ASCOPE method will identify critical physical domain and IE planning considerations, to 
include appropriate communications channels. Battalion-level intelligence shops might not 
have the organic manpower to complete the IPB, ASCOPE, and Temporal Lens products 
on their own. A solution for this is to request personnel support or pre-existing products 
from the MIG’s intelligence analytic personnel who are focused on defining the MEF’s 
AOs through all source intelligence and analysis. 
At the onset of Phase 1, IPB begins. During IPB, target audience analysis should 
be conducted which will allow planners to refine the messaging and emotional 
considerations needed to optimize effectiveness influencing the target audience. From the 
 
117 Adapted from Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Planning Process. 
65 
initiation of commander’s guidance, the process follows the ECPP Timeline (see Figure 
21). 
 
Figure 21. Proposed ECPP Timeline 
After receiving adequate ASCOPE and Temporal Lens information, Requirements 
one through eight can be completed on the ECPP Narrative Template (see Figure 22).  
 
Figure 22. Proposed ECPP Narrative Template 
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Requirements four, six, and seven are MEF-defined requirements. The information 
is supplied by the unit completing the ECPP Narrative Template, but the information is 
retrieved from higher-headquarters guidance. Requirements one, two, three, five, and eight 
are all identified and completed by the unit. Each requirement is defined as:  
1. The Target Audience the unit is anticipating to have an IE effect upon. 
When completing the subsequent requirements, consideration should be 
given on how to appropriately communicate with the Target Audience 
given the amplifying information garnered from the IPB, ASCOPE, and 
Temporal Lens products.  
2. The broadcasted goal of the unit’s mission. What does the unit desire to 
achieve through the conduct of this military activity? 
3. The explanation as to why the unit’s goal is of importance. 
4. When crafting the adversary category, this entity is defined competition of 
higher headquarters. This can be conceptual, such as an issue within the 
Marine Corps regarding cultural deficiencies, or this can be a defined 
terrorist organization or nation the U.S. is in competition with. 
5. The culminating event of the military activity intended to be viewed by the 
Target Audience. 
6. Additional units or personnel higher-headquarters desires to build trust 
and gain favor with. This entity is intended to be projected as a valuable 
ally or competent supporter to higher headquarters’ causes.  
7. The resolution to the unit’s activity; ultimately leading to the 
accomplishment of the MEF CG’s perception management goals. 
8. The unit conducting the military activity. The narrative will be told from 
the unit’s perspective throughout the conduct of the activity. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The summation of all research efforts has identified six conclusions: 
1. Information is generated as a result of all military activities. 
2. OIE is in the process of being integrated as a warfighting function, 
however the Marine Corps can enhance its small unit planning actions to 
better account for Information Environment impacts. 
3. Within governing military doctrine, human emotional considerations are 
present in defining OIE responsibilities and OIE benefits, even if only 
topical.  
4. Behavior sciences have come to identify a prominent relationship between 
emotions and decision-making processes in human audiences. 
5. Effective story architecture is a highly effective influence technique which 
leverages human emotions to convey messages. 
6. A simplistic planning addendum based on story architecture can be 
incorporated to provide Marine Corps planners with a means to factor 
human emotional considerations. 
These conclusions highlight a gap between doctrinal guidance and actual USMC 
practices regarding human emotional considerations. Additionally, the academic literature 
review identified and backed the importance of human emotion and its relationship to 
behavior, ultimately identifying story architecture as one possible mechanism with which 
to influence audience emotions. While numerous other recommendations can be provided 
to articulate emotional considerations, this thesis focused on story architecture due to its 
linear structure and the way in which it shares commonalities to linear planning processes 
existing within the Marine Corps. The provided recommendation of the ECPP is a proposed 
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solution to remedy the lack of emotional considerations in Marine Corps planning, 
specifically at the battalion-level units within a MEF.  
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
OIE is a developing activity within the DOD supported by a nascent community of 
information professionals. Currently, there is still basic discussion amongst major 
stakeholders regarding how the definitive terms should be named. Thorough review and 
critique of OIE organizations and authorities is actively occurring to best identify the 
military’s place and authority with Information. All of this is happening concurrently with 
the rapid development and distribution of information-sharing technology. The IoT is 
consistently growing, seeing social media and user-generated data rates climbing. In an 
effort to match the rate of increasing complexity of the Information Environment, the 
following suggested research efforts could prove beneficial in aiding the Marine Corps 
with maturing its Information community and identifying beneficial OIE efforts. 
As a result of Joint and Marine Corps operations and planning processes research, 
it became apparent OIE considerations with regards to timeliness is a topic which needs 
more development. There are multiple time factors within both OIE and the Marine Corps 
Planning Process. Operations officers and staff are faced with a timeline associated to the 
physical acts of the planned military activity. Supply, logistics, funding, and manpower 
planning requirements have been dominant planning factors for years, often 
overshadowing OIE and any influence considerations.  
Inspired by Everett Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovation and the defined adopter 
categories, further research into more closely relating military OIE messages with the 
adopters would prove beneficial. Identifying and relating specific influence techniques to 
the five adopter categories would aid OIE professionals in building a standing repository 
of OIE conceptual knowledge which could serve as a planner’s quick-reference guide.  
I suggest researching timelines associated with measuring the rate at which specific 
messages and ideas are adopted by an audience. Analyze a construct of short, medium, and 
long-term messages and the USMC’s need to have “canned” messages to use for short-
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term application and quick-turn operations. Case studies and historical military and 
marketing campaigns can be analyzed to identify effective themes, tactics, target audience 
characteristics, and timelines. The Marine Corps Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) 
is a time constricted, condensed MCPP. Pre-approved standardized planning products are 
highly valuable to this process.  
The Semi-Structured Discussion results identified many of the subject’s units were 
regionally aligned in terms of whom they support and augment. Similarly, MEFs are 
regionally aligned and typically provide support to specific Combatant Commands. Target 
Audience Analysis was mentioned many times throughout this report. It is suggested to 
dedicate thesis research efforts into conducting in-depth TAA for specific MEF areas of 
operation. The three MIGs could provide sponsorship of this research, and similarly 
provide intelligence analysts to aid in this effort. Given the liaison with USMC intelligence 
equities, this thesis research would have the potential to be classified.   
The Marine Corps possesses copious amounts of annual training requirements. 
MarineNet is the digital platform with which Marines conduct much of their annual training 
classes. Examples of these courses are the Uncle Sam’s OPSEC course, Cyber Security, 
and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response. Additionally, Marines are required to 
complete the Physical Fitness Test and Combat Fitness Test, as well as fire on the rifle 
range yearly because, “Every Marines is a rifleman.” These testing and educational 
requirements foster specific core values which are commonly held by all Marines. The 
same needs to be done in the current day and age of pervasive information. Research and 
design centered on building a Marine Corps annual training requirement focused on 
influence, perception management, and emotional management would prove highly 
beneficial to the Marine Corps. The end-state would be to foster a new, commonly accepted 
mentality making Marines more aware of the IE and how their specific actions generate 
impacts within it. As a secondary effect, the yearly training would help to build resiliency 
within the Marine Corps ranks against adversary OIE attempts.  
The final research suggestion is to analyze the Expeditionary Advanced Base 
Operations (EABO) and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) concepts 
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and identify Marine Corps OIE adjustments which will need to be made in order to best 
support the warfighter operating within those combat parameters. Small, disaggregated 
units operating and rapidly relocating and maneuvering within the enemy weapon 
engagement zone (WEZ) is a unique combat concept. USMC OIE efforts and application 
of IRCs will have new planning considerations which need to be identified and provided 
solutions. 
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APPENDIX B. PROPOSED EMOTION-CENTRIC PLANNING 
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